הקדמה למסכת חולין

B"H

KUNTRES

Introduction to Massechet Chullin

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Volume I

Foundations of the Sugya and the Essential Theme of the Tractate

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Based on the shiur of

HaRav Tzvi Yonatan Marton shlit"a

Delivered during the study of Chullin 2a

In loving memory of

R' Mordechai Nosson ben R' Nachman z"l

Foreword

This kuntres comprises the second portion of the opening shiur on Massechet Chullin, delivered by our master and teacher, HaRav Tzvi Yonatan Marton shlit"a, during the study of folio 2a. The shiur itself addressed the introduction and general framework of the tractate. Spanning roughly an hour and a half, it laid out the fundamental principles upon which the entire massechet is constructed, together with the relationship between the laws of chullin slaughter and the entire structure of korbanot we had studied previously.

The primary thesis emerging from the shiur is a foundational point: that Massechet Chullin is not merely a butcher's manual but rather the tractate that demonstrates how holiness descends from the Mount and enters the home of the individual Jew. The laws of shechita are not concerned only with removing an animal from doubt of נבילה (carrion); they are the means by which every Jew transforms his private table into something like a מזבח (altar), and his ordinary eating into a form of sacred consumption. This explains why Massechet Chullin is situated within Seder Kodashim rather than elsewhere.

Before entering the heart of the matter, we shall begin with the verses in Devarim chapter 12, and from there proceed to examine the foundational issue of "meat of desire," the problem of bloodshed inherent in eating meat, the dual solutions provided by the Torah in Vayikra and Devarim, the dispute between Chazal and the early sectarian groups regarding the relationship between these two passages, and conclude with the foundational point of Massechet Chullin as a whole: the creation of centers of sanctity outside the Sanctuary through shechita, the washing of hands, and the speaking of words of Torah at the table.

Be"H the remaining portions of the introduction will appear in separate kuntrasim, including an expanded treatment of

צער בעלי חיים (the prohibition of causing pain to animals), the rationales of the Rishonim for the mitzvah of shechita, the relationship between shechita and the ritual practices of ancient peoples, and a detailed analysis of the first mishnah of the tractate. May the One Above grant us merit to magnify and glorify the Torah.

Chapter 1 — The Nature of the Introduction and the Essential Theme of the Tractate

Before we enter the heart of the shiur, it is worthwhile to consider the nature of an introduction. An introduction is, by definition, a kind of revealing — a way of disclosing the underlying subject of the tractate. As we noted in our opening shiur, our approach is that the first two folios of the tractate themselves constitute the introduction to the entire sugya.

This is well known and explained in the academic study of the Talmud: the opening two folios were arranged by the later Amoraim — some say by the Savoraim — and there is debate as to who precisely performed this work. In any case, this is a late layer of sugya whose purpose is, through the gathering of halachot, the הלכות-דיגע מימרות (halacha-derived statements) and the citation of mishnaic formulations — material that on the surface appears to be entirely tangential — to actually disclose what the underlying theme of the tractate is.

This is precisely what we must trace. We shall not enter the Gemara directly just yet; rather, we shall begin with the verses, and afterward (be"H) we shall return and demonstrate that what I claim to be the theme of the tractate is identical to what the arrangers of the petichta accomplish through their selection of materials.

Chapter 2 — The Verses in Parshat Re'eh and the Basis of the Permission for "Meat of Desire"

The relevant verses are found in Parshat Re'eh, in Devarim chapter 12. Let us begin with verse 11:

"וְהָיָה הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם בּוֹ לְשַׁכֵּן שְׁמוֹ שָׁם, שָׁמָּה תָבִיאוּ אֵת כָּל אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוֶּה אֶתְכֶם, עוֹלֹתֵיכֶם וְזִבְחֵיכֶם, מַעְשְׂרֹתֵיכֶם וּתְרֻמַת יֶדְכֶם, וְכֹל מִבְחַר נִדְרֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר תִּדְּרוּ לַה'. וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה' אֱלֹהֵיכֶם, אַתֶּם וּבְנֵיכֶם וּבְנֹתֵיכֶם"

"And it shall be the place which Hashem your God shall choose to cause His name to dwell there, there you shall bring all that I command you, your burnt offerings and your sacrifices, your tithes and the offerings of your hand... And you shall rejoice before Hashem your God, you and your sons and your daughters." Here in Sefer Devarim it is made explicit that Hashem centralizes all of the divine service in one location — this is what is known as the "centralization of the cult." As the Scripture continues: "הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ בְּכָל מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר תִּרְאֶה" — "Take heed lest you offer your burnt-offerings in every place that you see"[1] — "כִּי אִם בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' בְּאַחַד שְׁבָטֶיךָ, שָׁם תַּעֲלֶה עֹלֹתֶיךָ"[2]. The Torah does not specify which place; rather, it promises that the Holy One, blessed be He, will choose a place and reveal it through His prophets.

Following these verses comes the passage of greatest significance for our discussion:

"רַק בְּכָל אַוַּת נַפְשְׁךָ תִּזְבַּח וְאָכַלְתָּ בָשָׂר כְּבִרְכַּת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן לְךָ בְּכָל שְׁעָרֶיךָ, הַטָּמֵא וְהַטָּהוֹר יֹאכְלֶנּוּ כַּצְּבִי וְכָאַיָּל. רַק הַדָּם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ, עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם"

"Only in all the desire of your soul you may slaughter and eat meat, according to the blessing of Hashem your God which He has given you in all your gates; the impure and the pure may eat of it as of the gazelle and the deer. Only the blood you shall not eat; you shall pour it out upon the earth as water." This is a difficult verse, and we shall return to discuss precisely what it speaks of and in which circumstances. For now we are simply reading the text. See Rashi ad loc., who brings the Sifri, and the Sifri discusses exactly what this verse refers to.[3]

Here we encounter an extraordinary and novel concept. Until this point in the Torah, the language of "pouring" (שפיכה) of blood appears only in connection with the altar, as in "וְדַם זְבָחֶיךָ יִשָּׁפֵךְ" regarding the altar. Now, suddenly, there is something new: the blood is poured out on the earth "as water" — like water. Until now blood was never "as water" but something entirely distinct — it was blood, not water. And here the Torah declares: "רַק הַדָּם לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ, עַל הָאָרֶץ תִּשְׁפְּכֶנּוּ כַּמָּיִם". This is a tremendous innovation requiring explanation, as we shall see.

We now arrive at verse 20, which is the verse of greatest importance for our purposes[4]: "כִּי יַרְחִיב ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת גְּבֻלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ, וְאָמַרְתָּ אֹכְלָה בָשָׂר" — "When Hashem your God expands your border as He has promised you, and you shall say: I will eat meat" — that is, you will say you wish to eat meat. And why does one wish to eat meat? "כִּי תְאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ לֶאֱכֹל בָּשָׂר" — "because your soul desires to eat meat." And it should be understood that "nefesh" here is not used as Chazal use it in other contexts — it is not the soul that wishes to eat meat, but the person. And the Torah states: "בְּכָל אַוַּת נַפְשְׁךָ תֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר" — you may eat meat of desire.

The verse continues: "כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָשׂוּם שְׁמוֹ שָׁם" — "when the place which Hashem your God has chosen to cause His name to dwell there is far from you." That is, when you dwell at a distance from the place which the Holy One, blessed be He, has chosen. In Sefer Devarim there is a prohibition of במות (private altars); the Torah has centralized all divine service in Yerushalayim, and this is the place of His choosing. Initially the chosen place was Shiloh — "וַיִּטֹּשׁ מִשְׁכַּן שִׁילוֹ" — and afterward the choice descended to the eternal House, "the resting place and the inheritance," as we studied at the close of Seder Moed.

Concerning this the Torah states: "וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן ה' לְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ וְאָכַלְתָּ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ בְּכֹל אַוַּת נַפְשֶׁךָ". The Torah tells us that one shall then slaughter from one's cattle and sheep, and how is one to slaughter? "כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ" — "as I have commanded you."

And the question presents itself: Where did the Holy One, blessed be He, command how to slaughter? The verse states that shechita must be performed "כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ" — but we find no prior verse that explicates the laws of slaughter! This is the great question, of which Chazal said that upon these three words — "וְזָבַחְתָּ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ" — the entire structure of the laws of shechita rests. As stated in Gemara Chullin 28a: "מלמד שנצטוה משה על הוושט ועל הקנה" — "this teaches that Moshe was commanded concerning the gullet and the windpipe."[5] We shall return to discuss this derashah of Chazal below.

The Scripture concludes: "אַךְ כַּאֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל אֶת הַצְּבִי וְאֶת הָאַיָּל כֵּן תֹּאכְלֶנּוּ, הַטָּמֵא וְהַטָּהוֹר יַחְדָּו יֹאכְלֶנּוּ. רַק חֲזַק לְבִלְתִּי אֲכֹל הַדָּם, כִּי הַדָּם הוּא הַנֶּפֶשׁ". That is, even now that I no longer require you to bring it to the Sanctuary — and consequently the blood is poured upon the earth rather than upon the altar — the blood remains forever forbidden for consumption.

Chapter 3 — The Foundation of the Prohibition: Outside Slaughter in Sefer Vayikra

Before entering the dispute itself, we must turn to the parallel passage in Sefer Vayikra chapter 17. There the Torah lays down a much stricter regime, which serves as the background against which Sefer Devarim's permission must be understood.[6]

"אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט שׁוֹר אוֹ כֶשֶׂב אוֹ עֵז בַּמַּחֲנֶה, אוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה, וְאֶל פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ לְהַקְרִיב קָרְבָּן לַה'... דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא, דָּם שָׁפָךְ, וְנִכְרַת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא מִקֶּרֶב עַמּוֹ"

"Any man of the House of Israel who slaughters a bull, a sheep, or a goat in the camp, or who slaughters outside the camp, and has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as a korban to Hashem... blood shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from among his people." This is an astonishing passage. The Torah here treats one who slaughters outside the Sanctuary as a שופך דמים (one who sheds blood) — a murderer in the literal sense, deserving of כרת (excision). The very act of slaughter outside the sacred precinct is murder.

What emerges is a foundational principle: in the worldview of Sefer Vayikra, eating meat outside the framework of a קרבן is not merely a ritual transgression. It is שפיכות דמים — actual bloodshed. The killing of an animal is a serious matter, comparable in some sense to homicide, and the Torah will permit it only when it is elevated into the realm of the sacred.

This is the background to the entire issue. According to Sefer Vayikra, while Israel dwelt in the wilderness, all meat-eating required the framework of korbanot. There was no such thing as "meat of desire." Every animal slaughtered required a journey to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, the sprinkling of its blood, the burning of its fats, and the consumption of the remainder as

שלמים (peace offerings). This was the regime as long as the entire nation was concentrated around the Mishkan.

The tannaitic dispute on this point is recorded in Chullin 16b–17a. According to R. Yishmael, the plain sense of the Torah is that non-sacrificial meat was entirely forbidden in the wilderness; according to R. Akiva, even in the wilderness בשר נחירה (meat from stabbing, without proper shechita) was permitted. Ramban on Devarim 12:21 adopts the view of R. Yishmael as the simple reading of Scripture.[7]

Chapter 4 — The Underlying Problem: Eating Meat as a Form of Bloodshed

Having seen the Torah's strict regime in Sefer Vayikra, we must pause to consider the underlying moral and spiritual problem that drives the entire discussion. This is not a technical halachic question alone; it touches the very foundations of how we relate to the taking of life.

Eating meat in the ancient world

In the modern world, meat-eating is so commonplace and so disconnected from its source that we scarcely consider the act itself. We purchase meat already cut, packaged, and prepared, and the original act of slaughter has been pushed entirely out of view. In the ancient world, however, the situation was radically different. The animal a family ate was, in many cases, an animal raised within that very family. Children played with the lambs and the goats; the household ox was a known and named creature. The act of taking the animal's life was not abstract — it was personal, immediate, and emotionally costly.

In such a context, the slaughter of an animal for food is not a trivial matter. It is, on some level, the taking of a life that is bound up with the household's daily existence. The Torah's treatment of this act with the language of

שפיכות דמים is not hyperbole — it captures something real about the moral weight of such an act.

The blood as the soul

Scripture itself reinforces this in declaring "כִּי הַדָּם הוּא הַנֶּפֶשׁ" — "for the blood is the soul." Blood is not merely a fluid; it is the seat of life itself. To pour out an animal's blood is, in the Torah's worldview, to pour out its נפש. And this is not far removed conceptually from the spilling of human blood, of which the Torah declares "שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ" (Bereishit 9:6).

The structural parallel is what gives Sefer Vayikra's language its force. One who slaughters outside the Sanctuary is treated as

שופך דם because, in a real sense, that is what he is doing. Outside the sacred framework, the killing of an animal for food is morally adjacent to the killing of a human being. It is only the framework of the קרבן — the recognition that the animal's life is being offered up to its Creator — that transforms slaughter from murder into worship.

The problem this creates for ordinary eating

This understanding poses an immediate problem. Eating meat is not, in human experience, a sacred ritual. It is an ordinary daily activity. People hunger, and they eat. They desire meat, and they consume it. If every act of meat-eating requires the framework of korbanot, then the practical lives of the Jewish people become impossible to sustain. When the people are concentrated around a single Mishkan in the wilderness, the system can function. But what of the future, when Israel will be spread across the entire Land?

This is the tension that the Torah itself must resolve. Sefer Vayikra established the principle: meat-eating outside the sacred framework is bloodshed. But Sefer Devarim must address the practical reality of national life across a wide territory. How can these two be reconciled? This is the question to which the entire rest of our discussion is devoted.

Chapter 5 — The Solution of Sefer Vayikra: Elevating the Meal to the Sacred

Before we examine the innovation of Sefer Devarim, we must appreciate what Sefer Vayikra's regime actually accomplishes. The Torah in Vayikra does not simply prohibit meat-eating; it provides a positive structure within which meat may be eaten — and indeed must be eaten — in a manner that resolves the problem of bloodshed.

The peace offering as a sacred meal

The mechanism Sefer Vayikra provides is the שלמים — the peace offering. When a person desires meat, he brings his animal to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. There, the blood is sprinkled upon the altar; the fats are offered up to Hashem; and the remainder is consumed by the owner and his household in a state of ritual purity within the Sanctuary precincts.

What has happened here? The act of slaughter has been removed from the realm of ordinary, random killing and placed within a framework of worship. The animal's blood — its soul — has been returned to its Creator upon the altar, not poured out indifferently upon the earth. The fats, the choicest portions, have been offered up. And only after this acknowledgment of the divine source of all life does the human being eat what remains.

This is not merely a ritual addendum to the act of eating. It transforms the meaning of the eating itself. What was, in its raw form, an act of bloodshed has become an act of communion. The same meat that, eaten randomly, would constitute

שפיכות דמים, now constitutes participation in the divine service. The boundary between sacred and profane has not been crossed — it has been honored.

Why this works

The genius of the Vayikra system is that it does not deny the moral problem; it solves it. Yes, taking the animal's life is a serious matter. Yes, the blood is the soul. But by directing the blood to the altar and the fats to the flame, the human being acknowledges the gravity of what he is doing. He recognizes that the animal's life is not his to take casually — it must be returned, in some form, to the One who gave it.

In this framework, every meal involving meat becomes, in essence, a religious act. The household table is not merely the site of consumption; it is the location of a sacred meal made possible by the prior service in the Sanctuary. The journey to the Mishkan, the slaughter at the entrance, the sprinkling of the blood, the burning of the fats — all of these prepare the way for the meal that follows.

The challenge this presents

We must be clear about what this regime demands. In Sefer Vayikra, there is no such thing as a hamburger eaten as a casual lunch. There is no quick meal of meat eaten on a whim. Every piece of meat that enters a Jewish mouth must have first passed through the divine service. This places an extraordinary burden on the system — a burden that can only be sustained when the entire population is centralized around a single Sanctuary.

And this is precisely the point of tension that Sefer Devarim must address. When Israel will be spread across the Land, when individuals will dwell at great distance from the chosen place, what then? The regime of Vayikra cannot continue in its original form. Something must give — but what?

This is the question that the second part of our discussion addresses, and it is here that the great dispute between Chazal and the sectarian groups will emerge.

Chapter 6 — The Innovation of Sefer Devarim: "When the Place is Far"

Sefer Devarim addresses the very tension we have outlined. The Torah here is no longer speaking of a unified camp clustered around the Mishkan, but of a future Israel spread across the entire Land. To require every meal of meat to pass through the Sanctuary is no longer feasible. And so the Torah issues a revolutionary permission:

"כִּי יַרְחִיב ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ אֶת גְּבֻלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ, וְאָמַרְתָּ אֹכְלָה בָשָׂר כִּי תְאַוֶּה נַפְשְׁךָ לֶאֱכֹל בָּשָׂר, בְּכָל אַוַּת נַפְשְׁךָ תֹּאכַל בָּשָׂר. כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לָשׂוּם שְׁמוֹ שָׁם, וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן ה' לְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ, וְאָכַלְתָּ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ"

"When Hashem your God expands your border as He has promised you, and you say: 'I will eat meat,' for your soul desires to eat meat — in all the desire of your soul you may eat meat. When the place which Hashem your God has chosen to cause His name to dwell there is far from you, you shall slaughter of your cattle and of your flock which Hashem has given you, as I have commanded you, and you shall eat in your gates."

The novelty of the permission

This is a remarkable departure from the regime of Vayikra. Suddenly, meat may be slaughtered and consumed at home — in one's "gates" — without ever bringing it to the Sanctuary. The blood is not sprinkled upon the altar; it is poured out upon the earth כמים (as water). The fats are not offered up; they are simply eaten or discarded. The entire framework of שלמים is bypassed.

From the perspective of Vayikra, this should be inconceivable. If slaughter outside the Sanctuary is שפיכות דמים, how can the Torah here permit precisely that? And yet Devarim does permit it — explicitly, deliberately, and with no apparent qualification beyond "when the place is far."

"As I have commanded you"

Yet the Torah does not entirely abandon the structure. There remain two crucial restrictions. First: "כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ" — "as I have commanded you." Slaughter, even outside the Sanctuary, must be performed according to a divinely commanded procedure. This is the foundation for the entire halachic apparatus of shechita that will fill our tractate. The act is not arbitrary; it must conform to specific requirements transmitted from Sinai.

Second: "רַק חֲזַק לְבִלְתִּי אֲכֹל הַדָּם" — "only be strong not to eat the blood." Even though the blood is no longer sprinkled on the altar, it remains absolutely forbidden for consumption. The recognition that "the blood is the soul" survives the relaxation of the Vayikra regime. The Torah may permit eating meat at home, but it does not permit treating that meat as ordinary food without any sacred dimension whatsoever.

A new framework, not an abandonment

What emerges is not the abandonment of the Vayikra worldview but its transformation. The act of slaughter retains its weight and its requirements, but the sacred framework is no longer geographic. It is no longer the Sanctuary that sanctifies the act; rather, the act itself, properly performed according to the divine commandment, carries its own sanctity wherever it occurs.

This is the foundation on which the entirety of Massechet Chullin rests. But before we can develop this thesis, we must confront a foundational dispute regarding precisely how Sefer Devarim's permission relates to Sefer Vayikra's prohibition — a dispute that lies at the heart of the rift between Chazal and certain sectarian groups of the Second Temple period.

Chapter 7 — The Foundation of the Dispute Between Chazal and the Second Temple Sects

We now arrive at one of the most consequential disputes in the history of Jewish biblical interpretation. The dispute is simple to state but profound in its implications: how do we read the relationship between the laws of Vayikra 17 and the permission of Devarim 12?

Two possible readings

One can read the relationship in two fundamentally different ways:

First reading: Sefer Devarim updates and replaces Sefer Vayikra. The original Vayikra regime — under which all meat-eating required passage through the Sanctuary — was appropriate for the wilderness period, when Israel was concentrated around the Mishkan. But once Israel enters the Land and spreads across the territory, that regime becomes inapplicable. The Torah in Devarim, anticipating this new reality, lifts the original prohibition entirely. Henceforth, meat may be eaten anywhere — even in Yerushalayim itself — provided only that the slaughter is performed properly and the blood is not consumed.

Second reading: Sefer Devarim does not replace Sefer Vayikra; it modifies it for limited circumstances only. The basic regime of Vayikra remains in force: ordinarily, meat must come through the framework of שלמים. Devarim's permission is a narrow concession granted only "when the place is far" — that is, only when one cannot physically reach the Sanctuary. The phrase "when the place is far" is not a description of the historical situation that triggered the new permission; it is a constraint defining the precise circumstances in which the permission applies.

The stakes of the dispute

The implications of these two readings are enormous. On the first reading, a person living in Yerushalayim itself, in full view of the Beit HaMikdash, may freely eat ordinary meat slaughtered at home, exactly as a person living far away may. The Vayikra regime is, in effect, historical — a stage in the development of Israel's relationship with God that has been superseded.

On the second reading, a person living near the Sanctuary cannot eat meat except as a

שלמים offering. Only those at a sufficient distance from the Sanctuary may slaughter for ordinary eating. The Vayikra regime remains in force at its core, and Devarim merely provides a geographic concession.

A foundational hermeneutical question

Behind this dispute lies a deeper question about how to read the Torah itself. Does Sefer Devarim — which is, according to Chazal's tradition, the משנה תורה, the recapitulation of the Torah — function as an authoritative reinterpretation of what came before? Or does it merely supplement the earlier books without altering their fundamental directives?[8]

We shall see in the coming chapters that Chazal embrace the first approach with full force: Devarim is the authoritative key for reading Vayikra. The sectarian groups, by contrast, embrace the second approach: Devarim must be subordinated to and integrated within the framework of Vayikra. This methodological divide produces, on the practical level, two entirely different worlds of halachic practice.

Chapter 8 — The Position of Chazal Versus the Position of the Sects

The position of Chazal

Chazal's position is articulated explicitly by the Ramban on Devarim 12:20:

"וְאֵין טַעַם 'כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם' שֶׁיִּהְיֶה מֻתָּר בְּהַרְחָקַת מָקוֹם בִּלְבָד, אִם כֵּן יֵאָסְרוּ יוֹשְׁבֵי יְרוּשָׁלַיִם בִּבְשַׂר תַּאֲוָה. אֲבָל אִם כֵּן יִסּוֹדֵי הַדָּבָר, יְדַבֵּר הַכָּתוּב לְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיֹאמַר לָהֶם, כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יַרְחִיב ה' אֶת גְּבוּלְכֶם וְלֹא תִהְיוּ כֻלְּכֶם יוֹשְׁבִים סָבִיב לַמִּשְׁכָּן, אֲזַי יִהְיֶה לָכֶם בְּשַׂר חֻלִּין מֻתָּר"

"The phrase 'when the place is far' cannot mean that the permission depends solely on geographic distance — for then the inhabitants of Yerushalayim would be forbidden 'meat of desire.' Rather, the foundation of the matter is this: Scripture speaks to all Israel, saying: when Hashem expands your border and you can no longer all dwell around the Mishkan, then 'meat of desire' will be permitted to you."[9]

The Ramban's reading is decisive. "When the place is far" is not a geographic test applied to each individual; it is a description of the historical-collective situation. Once Israel as a whole is spread out across the Land, the regime of Vayikra cannot function, and the permission of Devarim takes effect for everyone — including those who happen to live in Yerushalayim itself.

This is reflected in the Mishnah in Orlah (2:17) and in numerous other places throughout the Talmud where the inhabitants of Yerushalayim are presumed to eat ordinary meat freely. See Gemara Chullin 16b–17a for the main treatment of the sugya.[10]

The position of the Qumran sect

The position of the Qumran community, as preserved in the Temple Scroll (column 52, lines 13-16) and to some extent in 4QMMT (מקצת מעשי התורה), reads "when the place is far" as a strict geographical test. They specifically interpreted "far" as a distance of three days' walking — a measure derived, according to some, from Moshe's words to Pharaoh: "דֶּרֶךְ שְׁלֹשֶׁת יָמִים נֵלֵךְ בַּמִּדְבָּר".[11]

On the Qumran reading, only one who dwells at least three days' walking from the Sanctuary may slaughter for ordinary eating. Those closer must bring their animals to the Sanctuary as שלמים. The Vayikra regime remains substantially in force; Devarim merely creates a narrow exception.

The Karaite position

Centuries later, the Karaite movement would develop a similar reading. Anan ben David, the founder of the Karaites, wrote in his Sefer HaMitzvot: "בקר וצאן מותר לנו לאכול רק בשעריך" — that cattle and sheep are permitted to be eaten only in "your gates" — and from the verse "וְאָכַלְתָּ שָׁם" he derived that only there is it permitted to eat. Similar positions were developed by Qirqisani, al-Qumisi, and Yefet ben Ali, the latter holding that even outside the Land of Israel there remained a way to permit meat-eating as long as an altar could be erected.[12]

A historical thread

Dr. Rabbi Dovid Henshke has demonstrated in his article "Kedushat Yerushalayim Bein Chazal LeHalacha Atidit" that there is a continuous thread running from Qumran through medieval Karaism: all these groups share the view that the model of the wilderness camp is an eternal halachic ideal, and that Sefer Devarim must therefore be read as a narrow concession within the framework of Vayikra rather than as its replacement.[13]

Chazal, by contrast, read Vayikra through the lens of Devarim. For them, the wilderness camp was a historical stage, not an eternal model. Once Israel entered the Land and spread across its territory, the regime of Vayikra was nullified by virtue of the new reality, and the permission of Devarim took its full effect.

Chapter 9 — But What Then of the Fundamental Problem?

Here we must pause and address a serious difficulty. We have argued that Chazal read Sefer Devarim as fully nullifying the regime of Vayikra. Meat may be slaughtered and eaten anywhere, with no requirement of שלמים or proximity to the Sanctuary. But have we not thereby simply abandoned the original moral concern of Vayikra?

Restating the difficulty

Recall the original problem. Sefer Vayikra characterized slaughter outside the Sanctuary as שפיכות דמים — actual bloodshed. The framework of שלמים was not merely a ritual addendum; it was the device by which the act of slaughter was lifted out of the category of murder and into the category of worship. If we now say that Sefer Devarim has nullified that framework — that meat may be eaten anywhere, with the blood poured out upon the earth as water — have we not returned to precisely the situation Vayikra warned against?

If Chazal are correct that Sefer Devarim fully replaces the Vayikra regime, then what becomes of the moral problem? Has the Torah simply decided that bloodshed is no longer a concern? Has the spilling of an animal's blood lost the gravity that Vayikra attached to it?

Two possible responses

This question admits of two possible responses, and they lead to fundamentally different understandings of the entire enterprise of Massechet Chullin.

The first response: yes, in effect. The Torah in Devarim has simply lifted the prohibition. Animals may now be killed and eaten at home; the original concerns of Vayikra are historical artifacts of an earlier stage. Massechet Chullin, on this reading, is essentially a technical manual: here are the rules for slaughter, here are the laws of

טריפות (defects that render an animal forbidden), and so on. The moral framework of Vayikra is no longer operative.

The second response: not at all. The Torah in Devarim has not abandoned the Vayikra framework; it has transformed it. The sacred dimension that originally inhered in the act of

שלמים has been relocated — from the geographic Sanctuary to the act of slaughter itself, performed according to the divine commandment. On this reading, Massechet Chullin is not a technical butcher's manual but a treatise on how to maintain the sanctity of the meal outside the Sanctuary.

The thesis to be developed

It is the second response that I wish to develop in the remainder of this kuntres. The thesis is this: Massechet Chullin exists precisely to address the underlying problem of Vayikra in a post-centralized world. The laws of shechita are not merely technical; they are the means by which the original sanctity of the

שלמים is transposed into the framework of ordinary eating. The household becomes a kind of Sanctuary; the table becomes a kind of altar; the act of slaughter, properly performed, becomes the means by which the killing of an animal is once again elevated out of the category of שפיכות דמים and into the category of worship.

This is what justifies the placement of Massechet Chullin within Seder Kodashim. The tractate is not about ordinary meat in contradistinction to sacred meat; it is about the way in which ordinary meat retains, through the discipline of shechita, a fundamental connection to the sacred order originally established by Vayikra.

Before developing this thesis fully, however, we must take note of an alternative current that persisted in certain medieval sources — a current that, in a sense, refuses to let go of the Qumran-Karaite reading entirely, and reintroduces elements of it into the mainstream tradition. This is the subject of our next chapter.

Chapter 10 — External Halacha That Entered the Inside

In his article "Halacha Chitzonit SheNichnesah LiFnim" (External Halacha that Entered the Inside), Rabbi Dovid Henshke traces a fascinating phenomenon: even though Chazal definitively settled the question of "when the place is far" against the sectarian reading, the alternative interpretation continued to surface as an undercurrent in certain medieval commentaries. Laws that originated in sectarian circles outside the rabbinic tradition reentered the Beit Midrash through specific Rishonim — usually without any awareness on the part of those Rishonim that they were drawing on a sectarian thread.[14]

Let us examine several of the most striking examples.

Ibn Ezra on Vayikra 17:2

The Ibn Ezra writes on this verse:

"וְזֹאת הַמִּצְוָה תְּלוּיָה גַם בְּבֵית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, רַק בְּכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁקָּרוֹב לִירוּשָׁלַיִם, וְהַקָּרוֹב יְדַעְנוּ מִדִּבְרֵי קַבָּלָה, כִּי אִם הָיָה הַמָּקוֹם רָחוֹק יִזְבַּח וְיֹאכַל בָּשָׂר כְּאַיָּלוֹת"

"This mitzvah applies even when the Temple stands, in every place that is near to Yerushalayim — and what counts as 'near' we know from tradition. For if the place was far, one would slaughter and eat meat as if it were a deer or gazelle."[15]

The Ibn Ezra here essentially adopts the Qumran-Karaite reading. He holds that the requirement to bring animals to the Sanctuary as

שלמים is not merely a feature of the wilderness; it remained binding throughout the Temple era for those who lived near Yerushalayim. Only those at a distance — measured by some traditional but unspecified standard — could slaughter at home.

This is striking because it directly contradicts the position of the Mishnah in Orlah and the broader Talmudic tradition, which presume that Yerushalayim's inhabitants ate ordinary meat freely. As the author of "מבשר עזרא" (R. Meshulam Roth) observed: "This is against the halacha, for from tradition he has no place or mention in the Talmud anywhere."

Ibn Ezra on Vayikra 17:8

In a parallel comment on Vayikra 17:8, the Ibn Ezra elaborates:

"כִּי הִזְהִיר עַל עֵץ נְטִיעָה שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל מִפִּרְיוֹ עַד הַשָּׁנָה הַחֲמִישִׁית, גַּם כֵּן בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה לֹא יֹאכַל עַד שֶׁיִּזְרֹק דָּמוֹ עַל מִזְבַּח ה' אִם הָיָה קָרוֹב לִמְקוֹם הַמִּקְדָּשׁ"

"Just as Scripture warned regarding a planted tree that one may not eat its fruit until the fifth year, so too 'meat of desire' may not be eaten until its blood is sprinkled upon the altar of Hashem — if one is near the place of the Sanctuary."[16]

The Ibn Ezra brings as historical proof the incident of Shaul at Michmash (Shmuel I 14:34), where peace offerings were brought even though the Ark was still in the camp. He takes this to demonstrate that wherever the Ark — or by extension, any locus of divine Presence — was nearby, offering was required.

Rav Saadia Gaon on Daniel and the Chatam Sofer

The commentary attributed to Rav Saadia Gaon on Daniel chapter 13 records a tradition that the exiled community in Babylon did not eat the meat of cattle or sheep:

"שֶׁלֹּא אָכְלוּ בְּנֵי הַגּוֹלָה בָּשָׂר בָּקָר וָצֹאן בְּגָלוּת בָּבֶל, כִּי לֹא רָאוּי לִשְׁחוֹט כְּמוֹת שֶׁהוּא שׁוֹחֵט בָּאָרֶץ הַקְּדוֹשָׁה לְמַעַן זְרוֹק הַדָּם וְקַטֵּר הַחֵלֶב"

"That the exiled community did not eat cattle or sheep meat during the Babylonian exile, for one cannot slaughter as one would slaughter in the Holy Land in order to sprinkle the blood and burn the fats."[17]

Some have disputed whether this passage genuinely reflects the view of Rav Saadia Gaon himself. But what is decisive is that the Chatam Sofer (Chullin 107a) quoted these words and expounded upon them, explaining that according to this view, during the Babylonian exile the במות (private altars) would have been permitted, since the first sanctification of Yerushalayim sanctified only for its time and was nullified with the destruction. If altars could be erected anywhere, then no one was sufficiently "far" from a potential altar to qualify for the permission of בשר תאוה. The mere halachic possibility of erecting an altar nearby suffices to nullify the permission.[18]

This is a remarkable example of the phenomenon Henshke describes: a position that originated in sectarian circles — the view that proximity to a possible altar precludes "meat of desire" — has been transmitted, perhaps through unknown channels, into the heart of the mainstream halachic tradition through the Chatam Sofer.

Chochmat Manoach on Beitzah 101

A still more striking example appears in the Chochmat Manoach on Beitzah:

"בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם לֹא הָיָה רַשַּׁאי לִשְׁחוֹט שׁוּם בְּהֵמָה לֶאֱכוֹל אֶלָּא לִשְׁלָמִים בְּבֵית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר 'כִּי יִרְחַק מִמְּךָ הַמָּקוֹם', וְדָרְשׁוּ חַזַ"ל בְּרִחוּק מָקוֹם אַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ וְאֵין אַתָּה זוֹבֵחַ בְּקֵרוּב מָקוֹם, כְּמוֹ שֶׁהָיָה בַּמִּדְבָּר"

"In Yerushalayim one was not permitted to slaughter any animal for eating except as peace offerings in the Temple, for it says 'when the place is far,' and Chazal derived: in distance you slaughter, but you do not slaughter in nearness, just as in the wilderness."[19]

This statement is astonishing. The Chochmat Manoach asserts directly what the entire Talmudic tradition denies: that in Yerushalayim itself, no animal could be slaughtered for "meat of desire." Worse, he attributes this to Chazal — even though no such derashah appears in the extant Talmudic literature. This is, in effect, the Qumran position transposed into a 17th-century commentary, with the imprimatur of "Chazal said" appended.

R. Yosef Kara on Shmuel I

Finally, R. Yosef Kara on Shmuel I 14:32 advances a related position. After the destruction of Shiloh, when במות were permitted, Israel would erect private altars in their courtyards. R. Yosef Kara holds that during this period, if the blood was not sprinkled on the במה and the fats not burned, "meat of desire" was forbidden.[20]

He interprets "when the place is far" as meaning specifically: only when the place is at a distance such that one must travel to Yerushalayim is one permitted to slaughter without offering. But when there is a nearby site where one could erect an altar and sprinkle the blood, one is forbidden to eat "meat of desire" — for one stands in violation of "You shall not eat on the blood."

The phenomenon

What we observe in all these sources is the same phenomenon: a halachic position that Chazal explicitly rejected — that "when the place is far" is a geographic constraint defining the scope of the permission, rather than a historical-collective description of the new reality — has nevertheless persisted as an undercurrent in medieval and early modern Jewish thought.

This is what Rabbi Henshke means by "external halacha that entered the inside." It is a reminder that even definitive rulings by Chazal do not always succeed in fully extinguishing alternative streams of interpretation. The Qumran-Karaite reading lives on, in muted form, in the margins of rabbinic literature.

Having traced this current, we may now return to develop the main thesis of the kuntres: the affirmative position of Chazal regarding the meaning and purpose of Massechet Chullin.

Chapter 11 — The Foundation of the Tractate's Theme: Bringing Sanctity Outside the Sanctuary

We now arrive at the central thesis of this kuntres, and indeed at what I believe to be the central thesis of Massechet Chullin as a whole.

The general principle

A tractate, as a unit of Talmudic study, exists to address a problem. Massechet Chullin exists to address the following problem: how can the sacred framework of meat-eating be maintained outside the geographic Sanctuary? Or put differently: how can a structure of קודש be created in a world that exists לא במקדש — not in the Sanctuary?

The answer the tractate provides, through hundreds of folios of detailed halachic discussion, is this: through shechita. Through the rigorous discipline of properly performed slaughter, the act of taking an animal's life is removed from the category of arbitrary killing and elevated into the category of sacred procedure. Shechita receives the character of a deliberate, structured act, not a random expression of שפיכות דמים. It is not aggression, not the casual spilling of blood, but something far deeper.

The creation of household sanctity

What Chazal accomplish through the massechet is, in essence, the creation of a portable Sanctuary. The kedushah descends from the Temple Mount; it flows outward; it travels with every Jew into every Jewish home. Every house of every Jewish man and woman becomes, in some sense, a Mikdash. The kitchen of the Jew becomes a kind of mizbe'ach. And this is, fundamentally, what the laws of shechita accomplish. The halachot of shechita are this.

Shechita as ritual

Several Rishonim explain — each in different ways — that the essence of shechita carries within it a residue of שחיטת קודש (sacred slaughter) brought outside. The slaughter that ordinarily was performed within is now, by virtue of the permission of "when the place is far," performed without. But it is still a ritual — the same ritual, in essence.

Indeed, precisely because the Torah said "כי ירחק ממך המקום", shechita has now become the ritual. The ritual ordinarily performed within — now you are declaring something new: you no longer need the place, you no longer need the time, you no longer need restricted boundaries. In every Jewish home, in every place, at every time — one can essentially perform a kind of שחיטת קודש. This is the essence. And this is why Massechet Chullin is situated within Seder Kodashim. This is the foundation.

The ideal of Vayikra has not been abandoned

Let me emphasize this point. This is the principle by which we can understand how, although "when the place is far" applies according to Sefer Devarim, Sefer Vayikra has not been nullified. The ideal of Sefer Vayikra has not been nullified. The practice of Sefer Vayikra has been nullified — for the practice is now governed by Sefer Devarim — but the ideal of Sefer Vayikra has not been nullified.

We must pause on this point and reflect deeply. In essence, there is one place where the Divine Presence dwells — the Beit HaMikdash. This is how it is expressed in our liturgy: "There is none beside Him," "There is none but You our Redeemer." But in the ancient world this was not at all a simple statement. Not every place is one of

השראת השכינה (indwelling of the Divine Presence); rather, there is one specific place, and only there does the Shechinah dwell.

Chazal's accomplishment, in their characteristic way, is this: although the geographic Sanctuary remains the unique locus of the Divine Presence, the practices that produced and maintained that Presence can be replicated, in transformed form, elsewhere. Now — and I must clarify, this is not to say that this development occurred only at the destruction; it likely began earlier, since from the moment Israel entered the Land they no longer needed certain wilderness-period derivations. But the development certainly took on far greater significance after the Destruction.

This connects to the broader theme that we have discussed repeatedly in earlier shiurim: that Chazal took the Mikdash and rendered it, as it were, wireless — a portable Sanctuary that travels with every Jew into every Jewish home. We have spoken of this many times. And this, in essence, is the idea of Massechet Chullin.

Chapter 12 — A Person's Table Atones

We must now develop this point further. According to my approach, there is a direct continuity here with the close of the previous tractate. We concluded the previous massechet with the matter of the Beit Chonio. The Beit Chonio — which we discussed at length on Shavuot night — is the prime example of an attempt to reckon with the idea that there need not be only one center of holiness in Yerushalayim, but that other centers of holiness might also exist. This is one approach to creating an alternative, as it were, in our time when there is no Beit HaMikdash — to preserve the realms of holiness.

Chazal in practice rejected the model of Beit Chonio; there is a dispute as to whether it was for the sake of Heaven or not. We discussed this on Shavuot night, and we may speak in the future, be"H, of the temple that stood on Mount Gerizim, returning to the broader theme of alternative sanctuaries. But ultimately — what is the alternative? The Mishnah in Chullin provides the answer: shechita is the alternative.

The connection to the end of Menachot

There is even a connection to what we studied at the close of Massechet Menachot, and the truth is the connection runs even deeper. Chazal tell us — and we have already discussed this — that one who understands what the world of the Beit HaMikdash was knows that when suddenly there is no Beit HaMikdash, an immense and devastating problem arises. How does one confront such a problem?

This is the conversation we have returned to repeatedly: that Chazal provided substitutes for the situation in which there is no Mikdash. As we have discussed, one medium is Torah. Another medium is acts of kindness, and we have already discussed this. Another medium is the synagogue —

"מקדש מעט", "a miniature sanctuary." And now I wish to discuss the medium of "שלחנו של אדם מכפר" — a person's table atones.

The language of the Gemara in Berachos

Thus says the Gemara in Berachos 55a:[21]

"כְּתִיב 'הַמִּזְבֵּחַ עֵץ שָׁלֹשׁ אַמּוֹת גָּבְהוֹ', וּכְתִיב 'וַיְדַבֵּר אֵלַי זֶה הַשֻּׁלְחָן אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי ה''. פָּתַח בְּמִזְבֵּחַ וְסִיֵּם בַּשֻּׁלְחָן. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר דְּאָמְרֵי תַּרְוַיְהוּ: בִּזְמַן שֶׁבֵּית הַמִּקְדָּשׁ קַיָּם, מִזְבֵּחַ מְכַפֵּר עַל יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְעַכְשָׁיו שֻׁלְחָנוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם מְכַפֵּר עָלָיו"

"It is written 'the altar of wood, three cubits high,' and it is written 'And he said to me, this is the table that is before Hashem.' Scripture opened with altar and closed with table. R. Yochanan and R. Elazar both said: when the Beit HaMikdash stood, the altar atones for Israel; and now, a person's table atones for him."

Two interpretations

It is true that Chazal connect this matter to the continuation of the verse "וַיְדַל מֵעַם הָאָרֶץ וַיַּרְב לוֹ לֶחֶם", and so Rashi and the Tosafot in Menachot 97 explained that the matter pertains to acts of kindness and the giving of bread to the poor. On this reading, it is fundamentally about charity and chesed — what one gives to the destitute.

Yet I maintain that, while this is certainly true, the plain language of "a person's table" suggests something more direct: a person's own table — without any explicit mention of hospitality or charity — refers to the very act of eating, when conducted in an atmosphere of sanctity, as itself constituting atonement.

Not in the manner of the Qumran community — and I do not mean to say "in the manner of a sect." Among Chazal — as we have discussed — Chazal are not "tzaddikim" in this sense. And I am not, God forbid, saying that they are not tzaddikim and chassidim, but Chazal are chachamim — scholars. And what do scholars do? How does sanctity in the manner of chassidut become operative among scholars?

The teaching of the Mishnah in Avot

The sacred Mishnah in Avot, chapter 3 mishnah 3, says:[22]

"רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר, שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁאָכְלוּ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד וְלֹא אָמְרוּ עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, כְּאִלּוּ אָכְלוּ מִזִּבְחֵי מֵתִים. אֲבָל שְׁלֹשָׁה שֶׁאָכְלוּ עַל שֻׁלְחָן אֶחָד וְאָמְרוּ עָלָיו דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה, כְּאִלּוּ אָכְלוּ מִשֻּׁלְחָנוֹ שֶׁל מָקוֹם"

"R. Shimon says: three who have eaten at one table and have not spoken words of Torah over it are as though they had eaten from offerings of the dead, for it is said 'all tables are full of vomit and filthiness, no place is clean.' But three who have eaten at one table and have spoken words of Torah over it are as though they had eaten from the table of the Omnipresent, for it is said: 'And he said to me, this is the table that is before Hashem.'"

This is the depth of the matter. Among chassidim one would prepare for the meal with מקווה, with פראנצעס (a particular kind of inner spiritual orientation), and the entire structure of preparation. I do not speak of this lightly — I want you to grasp the point. And the point is, as I have said above, that indeed among the Essenes one finds a parallel structure, so that this too is a structure worth highlighting; but in Chazal we have found the same idea. It is, in essence, similar to the position of the Essenes.

But what is such a meal? A meal in which words of Torah are spoken. Divrei Torah — that is what makes it a meal. A meal in which divrei Torah are spoken.

The parallel to the Roman symposium

There is a parallel here in the Roman world. In the Roman world too, there is such a phenomenon — a meal is not an empty matter, not a random affair. One sits at a meal, there is the symposium, philosophical disputations are conducted at the meal, all the great philosophical debates of antiquity took place at meals. And Chazal created our symposium. Every meal at which three have eaten together and discussed words of Torah, Chazal say, is an immense thing. Chazal say it is as though they had eaten from the table of the Omnipresent.

The phrase that appears throughout Chazal — "כהנים אוכלים ובעלים מתכפרים, משולחן גבוה קזכו" ("the priests eat and the owners are atoned for, they merit from the table on high") — this, in essence, is what occurs when three sit and eat together and discuss words of Torah.

Chapter 13 — The Parallel to the Qumran Community's Practice and the Idea of the Sacred Meal

Here we must observe an important point. There were Jews during the period of the Second Temple who were not satisfied with the Mikdash — the people of Qumran. As we have already discussed, they withdrew from the Beit HaMikdash to the caves. In effect they refrained from participating in the Temple service. So how did they construct an alternative? They wished to eat meat, and they had no obligation to do so — but how did they make their alternative for the eating of meat?

The meal as a substitute for the Mikdash

From the writings of Qumran it is abundantly clear that the communal meal took on a sacred character for them. It served them as a substitute for the eating of קדשים. Meals occupied an enormous place in the life of the community. They called the meal a טיש (a "tisch" — a table). Every meal was a tisch. It was not merely that they ate; they ate around a table. The entire community ate together at one table. And it was not ordinary eating but eating before the Holy One, blessed be He, with the consciousness that this was a sacred meal.

This was, in essence, their "replacement" for the Beit HaMikdash. For they claimed that they were unable to ascend to the Beit HaMikdash. And the great source for this is Yosef ben Mattityahu — Josephus.

The testimony of Josephus on the Essenes

Yosef ben Mattityahu in Wars of the Jews II, 8:5[23], describing the Essenes — and we have once discussed whether the Essenes are properly to be identified with the Qumran community or not, though for our purposes here the question is moot — says of their meals:

"And after this they gather together in one place, and they gird themselves with linen aprons" — they don white garments — "and bathe their bodies in cold water; and after their purification they turn, all of them, to a special chamber"

— a particular location in which they would arrange the table.

He continues: "into which no outsider has permission to enter" — into which no stranger may come. That is, you must be one of them. One who is not a chasid (in their sense) cannot enter. One must be part of the group. It is exclusive.

"and those not of their fellowship; and they go in purity as those going to a holy place. And when they come to the place of this meal — upon their arrival there — the priest prays before they eat" — the priest makes a blessing before the meal. "After they finish eating, the priest recites various prayers. Thus they open and close their meal with prayer to God, the Giver of life; and after this they put off the holy garments and return to perform their labor."

This is something extraordinarily powerful. They created for themselves a substitute for the service of korbanot, by generating the "vibes" of the Mikdash through the medium of the sacred meal.

Chazal — without sect and without special tischen

And the truth is, this is in essence the counsel that Chazal offer for the period after the Destruction — and not for the period when the Beit HaMikdash stood. Rather, after the Destruction in essence. And this is what Chazal say in the Gemara in Berachos that we cited above: "And now a person's table atones for him" — "and now," not "in the time of the Temple."

And it must be emphasized: Chazal are not "tzaddikim" in the manner of a sect. Among Chazal there need be no special "sect," but every Jewish person. Every meal at which three have eaten and at which divrei Torah have been spoken — this suffices. In simpler terms: it suffices for a person to eat and to speak divrei Torah at his meal, in order to transform his table into a kind of mizbe'ach.

Chapter 14 — Netilas Yadayim and the Sanctity of Kodesh: Extending Mikdash Sanctity to Chullin

We now arrive at an additional and essential point connected to the very theme of the tractate: the washing of the hands for the eating of חולין (ordinary, non-sacred food). On its face the matter is exceedingly puzzling — for נטילת ידיים is, by its origin, one of the laws of טהרת הקודש (purity of sanctified food). What has it to do with the eating of ordinary food?

Rabban Gamliel and the foundation of the matter

We find in the words of Chazal in Seder Eliyahu Rabba ch. 26[24] a great foundation for this matter:

"מִכָּאן הָיָה רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹכֵל חֻלִּין בְּטָהֳרָה וְאוֹמֵר לְתַלְמִידָיו, לֹא לַכֹּהֲנִים בִּלְבָד נִתְּנָה קְדֻשָּׁה, אֶלָּא לַכֹּהֲנִים וְלַלְוִיִּם וְלַיִּשְׂרְאֵלִים. מִכָּאן אָמְרוּ כָּל הַמְזַלְזֵל בִּנְטִילַת יָדַיִם סִימָן רַע לוֹ"

"From here, Rabban Gamliel would eat ordinary food in ritual purity, and would say to his students: holiness was not given to the priests alone, but to priests, Levites, and Israelites alike. From here they said: whoever takes lightly the washing of the hands, it is a bad sign for him."

Here we have the foundation of the matter stated explicitly: kedushah is not the exclusive heritage of the priests, but belongs to all of Israel. Through netilas yadayim, every Jew can transform his eating into a kind of priestly eating of kodesh. This is something tremendous and wondrous, demonstrating how Chazal labored to bring down the kedushah from the Sanctuary and into the home of every Jew.

The reason offered by the Levush

Thus writes the Levush in Orach Chayim 158[25]: that the reason for netilas yadayim in our time is that the Beit HaMikdash should speedily be rebuilt. The meaning of his words is clear: netilas yadayim is not an independent mitzvah of "eating-purity"; rather, we are training ourselves, every time we eat bread, to do so in the manner of אכילת קודש — as though the Beit HaMikdash had already been rebuilt and we were eating in purity.

This is in essence a direct continuation of what we have established in the preceding chapters: the eating of a Jew is not ordinary eating. Every meal is, in essence, a form of

אכילת קדשים. And by washing our hands, we transform our table into a מקדש מעט, and our eating into the service of kodesh.

The parallel to Qumran ritual immersion

Here too the parallel with our earlier discussion remains pointed. The Qumran community would bathe in cold water before their meal, as Josephus described. But here too there is a fundamental difference. For the sect, this was a sectarian purification requiring entry into a mikveh before each meal. For Chazal, netilas yadayim alone suffices — and without the need for any specially designated sacred space.

This points to the general approach of Chazal: not to create a narrow sect that embodies kedushah, but to distribute kedushah among all Israel — and every person can attain it in equal measure by observing simple halachot. This is, if you will, the "democratization of kedushah."

Chapter 15 — The Words of the Sifri on "As I Have Commanded You"

We must now return to the act of shechita itself. We have established that the entire Massechet Chullin exists to address the problem of שפיכות דמים and to invest the act of slaughter with the character of קדושה. The source for this is found explicitly in the words of the Sifri, which stand at the foundation of all the derashot of Chazal regarding the laws of shechita.

The text of the Sifri

Such is the language of the Sifri on the verse "וְזָבַחְתָּ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ"[26]:

"מַה קָּדָשִׁים בִּשְׁחִיטָה אַף חֻלִּין בִּשְׁחִיטָה, אוֹ מַה קָּדָשִׁים בִּמְחִצָּה אַף חֻלִּין בִּמְחִצָּה, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר וְאָכַלְתָּ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ"

"Just as קדשים require shechita, so too חולין require shechita; or perhaps just as קדשים require a מחיצה (designated location), so too חולין require a מחיצה? Therefore Scripture says: 'And you shall eat in your gates.'"

Behold what is stated explicitly: the Sifri derives all the laws of שחיטת חולין from the laws of שחיטת קדשים. The shechita itself is identical; only the location and timing differ. For sanctified meat there is a mechitzah, a designated holy space; for ordinary meat there is no mechitzah, but "בשעריך" — in any location one wishes. But the act of slaughter itself — both are equivalent.

The significance of the derivation

This is what I have been arguing throughout the kuntres: shechita is a ritual; it is not random killing. By removing shechita from the framework of the Beit HaMikdash, the Torah has not nullified its sacred character — it has merely lifted the geographic restrictions. The act of slaughter itself remains the ritual of

"כאשר צויתיך", embodying all the laws of shechita given at Sinai.

Thus says the Torah: "וְזָבַחְתָּ מִבְּקָרְךָ וּמִצֹּאנְךָ אֲשֶׁר נָתַן ה' לְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ, וְאָכַלְתָּ בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ בְּכֹל אַוַּת נַפְשֶׁךָ". The words "כאשר צויתיך" are the key to the entire tractate. They do not appear by accident; they indicate that there is divine instruction in every matter of שחיטת חולין, and we dispute over this in all of Massechet Chullin.

The laws of shechita as the laws of kodesh

This is the principle behind the Mishnaic ordering: the laws of שחיטת חולין are positioned within Seder Kodashim. According to our analysis, this is entirely intelligible — even though the slaughter is of chullin, its character is that of kodashim. And therefore its placement is also among kodashim. And the entirety of Massechet Chullin is, in essence, the chapter on how to perform shechita of kodashim outside the Sanctuary — which is the lived reality of the ordinary Jew after the Destruction.

Chapter 16 — Two Voices in Chazal: Ritual Versus Practice

We must now consider a subtle point. In the derashot of Chazal on "כאשר צויתיך" there appear to be two distinct voices sounding side by side, and one must examine the difference between them carefully.

The first voice — shechita as kodashim

The first voice is that of the Sifri we have already cited: "מה קדשים בשחיטה אף חולין בשחיטה" ("Just as קדשים require shechita, so too חולין require shechita"). Here the emphasis is on the ritual character of shechita — that it resembles the slaughter of kodashim. The act of slaughter is, in essence, a ritual. This is the voice we have followed throughout the kuntres.

The second voice — Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai

But there is another voice, in the Gemara Chullin 28a[27]:

"רַבִּי אוֹמֵר, 'וְזָבַחְתָּ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ', מְלַמֵּד שֶׁנִּתְרַבּוּ לְמֹשֶׁה הִלְכוֹת שְׁחִיטָה, רֹב אֶחָד בָּעוֹף וְרֹב שְׁנַיִם בַּבְּהֵמָה"

"Rebbi says: 'And you shall slaughter as I have commanded you' teaches that the laws of shechita were multiplied to Moshe — a majority of one [siman] for a bird, and a majority of two [simanim] for an animal."

Here the emphasis is no longer on the resemblance to kodashim, but on the specific content of the laws of shechita — practical halachic details: how much must be cut, how many סימנים for a bird, how many for an animal. This is no longer merely an "atmosphere" of kodashim; these are independent halachot given as הלכה למשה מסיני (a law transmitted to Moshe at Sinai).

The relationship between the two voices

I would suggest the following: it must be considered whether these two views dispute one another or complement one another. It is possible that the two views disagree fundamentally regarding the meaning of the expression "כאשר צויתיך". According to one approach, the ritual aspects of shechita are the essence, and therefore shechita as a whole is one thing with the shechita of kodashim. According to the second approach, there is here an independent halachic system, given to Moshe at Sinai as such, and therefore there is no need to forge a "unity" between the slaughter of chullin and the slaughter of kodashim.

Yet upon reflection, it appears that even if there are two distinct positions at the core, both arrive at the same conclusion with respect to the ritual: shechita is not random killing, but is an act explicitly commanded by the Torah — "as I have commanded you" — and by virtue of this it is removed from the category of

שפיכות דמים. Whether this is due to the resemblance to kodashim, or due to its status as a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai — in either case, shechita is a ritual, and not murder.

Eretz Yisrael as altar

This connects to a further point in Chazal. In the Mechilta DeRabbi Yishmael, Parshat Yitro[28], it is stated: "עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִבְחֲרָה יְרוּשָׁלַיִם הָיְתָה כָּל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּשֵׁרָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ" — "Before Yerushalayim was chosen, all of Eretz Yisrael was fit for an altar." And in Avot DeRabbi Natan it is brought: "כָּל הַקָּבוּר בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל כְּאִלּוּ קָבוּר תַּחַת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ, לְפִי שֶׁכָּל אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל רְאוּיָה לְמִזְבֵּחַ" — "Anyone buried in Eretz Yisrael is as though buried beneath the altar, for all of Eretz Yisrael is fit to be an altar."

Here is a tremendous foundation: in essence, the entirety of Eretz Yisrael carries the potential of an altar. Yerushalayim was chosen — but the power of offering and of sanctity is not confined to Yerushalayim alone. This is the depth of the principle that completes the position of Chazal: holiness is not concentrated in a single place alone; it can be distributed throughout all of Eretz Yisrael, in every Jew wherever he may be, and at every table and meal.

Chapter 17 — Tza'ar Ba'alei Chayim: The Juridical Expression of Bloodshed

We shall close the kuntres with one final point connected to the entire arc we have traced. We have argued that the underlying problem with the eating of chullin meat is שפיכות דמים — bloodshed — and that the very act of shechita receives a ritual character precisely to remove it from this category.

The prohibition of tza'ar ba'alei chayim

Now, there is in Chazal the great principle of "צער בעלי חיים דאורייתא" (causing pain to animals is a Torah prohibition). Many have engaged with this question, and there is debate whether it is mid'oraita or mid'rabbanan; some Rishonim held it is mid'oraita and some held it is mid'rabbanan. But beyond all this — there is a deeper point: צער בעלי חיים is, in essence, the juridical expression of the underlying principle we have established — of the fundamental problem in taking life from a living creature.

That is: the Torah prohibited "שפיכות דמים" of an animal through the restriction of shechita — that shechita must be performed in a defined manner, in the manner of "as I have commanded you." But beyond this, there is a general framework of צער בעלי חיים, which expresses the same principle: it is forbidden for a Jew to view a living creature as an ordinary instrument and to treat it cruelly.

The tension between shechita and tza'ar ba'alei chayim

There appears to be a contradiction here: shechita itself is, manifestly, an instance of צער בעלי חיים! How could the Torah permit shechita if there is a prohibition of causing pain to animals?

The answer, by our analysis, is clear: shechita is permitted precisely because it is performed in the manner of a ritual, of

"כאשר צויתיך". In this manner, shechita is not צער בעלי חיים motivated by cruelty or contempt; it is the fulfillment of a mitzvah, an act of קודש. But beyond this, any other act of inflicting suffering on animals that is not within the framework of explicit permission remains under its prohibition.

This is the depth of the matter: the Torah did not permit shechita as a neutral act, but elevated it to the status of

קודש. In doing so, it removed from shechita the "randomness" of שפיכות דמים, while leaving in force the general prohibition against any act of cruelty that is not within the framework of the sacred.

The Perushim after the Destruction

See Gemara Bava Batra 60b[29] regarding the פרושים (the ascetics) who refrained from eating meat and drinking wine after the destruction of the Temple. One must consider the depth of their position: was this purely on grounds of mourning, or did they understand that after the Destruction the very foundation permitting the eating of meat had been nullified, and that the problem of שפיכות דמים had returned in full force? Although Chazal did not accept their path in practice, nevertheless their position contains a profound echo of the foundational problem we have addressed throughout this kuntres.

Conclusion and benediction

With this we shall conclude our discussion. We have seen how Sefer Vayikra established the problem — that one may not eat meat without the framework of

שלמים, for without this framework the act constitutes שפיכות דמים. And we have seen how Sefer Devarim provided the permission — that when Hashem expands our border and we cannot always come to the Sanctuary, we may slaughter anywhere, provided that we do so "כאשר צויתיך".

We have seen the foundational dispute between Chazal and the sects over the interpretation of "when the place is far" — Chazal holding that Sefer Devarim entirely nullifies the prohibition of Vayikra, and the sects (Qumran, Karaites) holding that Sefer Devarim merely restricts the permission to circumstances of actual distance from the Sanctuary.

And we have seen how Chazal did not rest content with the mere permission of "when the place is far," but constructed an entire framework of sanctity for chullin — laws of shechita modeled on the laws of kodashim, washing of the hands modeled on priestly purification, the shared meal with words of Torah modeled on the table of the Omnipresent. This is, in essence, the point of departure of Massechet Chullin: to construct a framework of קודש in the realm of חולין, a framework that stands in the place of the service of korbanot.

May it be His will that through the study of Massechet Chullin we may merit to witness the rebuilding of the Beit HaMikdash speedily in our days, and that Israel may once again ascend to its Sanctuary, that the שלמים may return to their place, and that our table and the altar may once again be one. And may there be fulfilled in us "וְזָבַחְתָּ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוִּיתִיךָ" in its plainest sense. Amen and amen.

* * *

In Memory Of

R' Mordechai Nosson ben R' Nachman z"l

May his soul be bound in the bond of eternal life